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The paper aims at investigating how far transaction costs economics (TCE) concurs in the 
explanation of outsourcing decisions in firms characterized by “thick’ industrial relations, that is 
where unions and employees are involved in, and are sometimes able to affect, the relative 
managerial decisions through participatory formal and informal mechanisms. What is more, the 
paper aims at investigating whether the concurrence of TCE and industrial relationships has 
different outsourcing implications for firms which are also involved in delocalization strategies. An 
empirical model, translating a set of theoretical correlations between an original outsourcing extent 
variable, on the one hand, and a number of proxies related to TCE, industrial relations and 
delocalization, on the other hand, is applied to a representative sample of manufacturing firms for 
the local production system of Reggio Emilia (RE) (in Northern Italy). 
Overall, the empirical application shows that the role of TCE in accounting for outsourcing in the 
LPS of RE is quite blurred, if not even contradicted, while the role of industrial relations emerges 
instead quite straightforwardly. Finally, RE firms generally use outsourcing and international 
delocalization in a complementary way, but the correlation between outsourcing and delocalization 
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 1  Introduction 
 
Empirical  evidence  shows  that outsourcing, meant  in  general  as  “the use of  goods  and 
services produced outside the enterprise” (OECD, 2007, p.15) has risen dramatically in the 
last decay, both in volume and in value. This has spurred a substantial increase of interest in 
economic  literature  for  the  phenomenon,  in  particular  for  those  situations  in  which 
outsourcing occurs abroad, that is for what is usually called offshoring: either in the form of 
some kind of international sub-contracting to non-affiliated enterprises, or of some extent of 
production  transfer  abroad  within  the  same  group  of  enterprises  or  to  newly  created 
affiliates. 
The  standard  approach  in  interpreting  the  outsourcing  phenomenon  focuses  on 
transaction costs (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002), ownership allocation (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986), formal vs. real authority (e.g. Aghion and Tirole, 1997) and, in general, on the 
entailed incentive conflicts which emerge between the “outsourcer” and the “outsourcee” 
(Foss, 2000). In particular, transaction cost economics (TCE) has emerged as an interesting 
explanation  of  the  “make-or-buy”  choices  of  the  firm  which  conveniently  matches  the 
nature of the firm organization with that of the relevant transactions (e.g. Gonzalez-Diaz, 
Arruñada, and Fernandez, 2000). 
In spite of its notable strengths, the TCE account of outsourcing relies on a set of non 
fully satisfactory hypotheses (Mahnke, 2001). First of all, and in general, it does not address 
the  ‘real  time’  (Langlois,  1992)  in  which  outsourcing  (as  well  as  vertical  integration) 
decisions are taken, and thus disregards phenomenon such as path-dependency, inertia and 
“governance inseparability” (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999). Second, and in particular with 
respect  to  its  international  manifestation,  TCE  and  the  other  contractual  accounts  of 
outsourcing  (and  of  vertical  integration)  leave  production  as  such  “out  of  the  door” 
(Langlois, 1992; Montresor, 2004), and ends up with treating the delocalization decisions of 
the firms as a pure variant of the broad outsourcing paradigm. 
While possibly unproblematic in some other contexts, the two previous assumptions can 
be argued to limit the interpretative power of TCE with respect to the outsourcing decisions 
of firms which are “embedded” (Granovetter, 1985) in local production systems (LPS), of   2 
which “industrial districts” represent the most notable example. On the one hand, in these 
contexts the presence of a consolidated ‘social capital’ usually mitigates the opportunism of 
the  agents  embodied  by  TCE,  while  the  “thick”  industrial  relations  of  the  local  firms’ 
organization makes governance inseparability quite sensitive for the outsourcing decision. 
On the other hand, rather than a pure specification of outsourcing, in the same contexts 
delocalization decisions intertwine with it in a way – complementary or substitutive – which 
is also affected by the firms’ governance and by their industrial relations.  
As a sort of illustrative test of this argument, the paper refers to a specific LPS of Emilia-
Romagna (i.e. Reggio Emilia) in order to address two related research questions: (i) how far 
TCE  matters  in  the  outsourcing  decisions  of  firms  characterized  by  ‘thick’  industrial 
relations and embedded in a “typical’ local production system; (ii) whether and how the 
delocalization choice of these firms correlates with their outsourcing decisions. 
In  addressing  these  research  questions  the  paper  conveys  at  least  three  elements  of 
originality.  First,  from  a  conceptual  point  of  view,  the  outsourcing  and  delocalization 
decisions  of  firms  are  embedded  in  a  setting  where  transaction  costs  are  affected  by 
idiosyncratic local elements, mainly the nature and quality of workers involvement in firm 
innovation decisions and industrial relations. Second, from a methodological point of view, 
both outsourcing and delocalization are captured going beyond standard, pure dichotomic 
variables (of the “yes” or “not” kind) and rather referring to their actual extent and to their 
specific patterns. Third, from an applied point of view, the empirical investigation is carried 
out by exploiting two consequential surveys administered to the same firms (in 2002 and 
2005) in order to reduce the potential endogeneity stemming from the simultaneity between 
outsourcing and its potential drivers.  
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 sketches the theoretical background 
of the paper by addressing the interpretations outsourcing and delocalization find in a LPS 
environment. Section  
3 illustrates the extent of outsourcing and delocalization in the LPS of Reggio Emilia. 
Sections  
4  and  5  present  the  model  and  the  dataset  through  which  the  two  phenomena  are 
empirically investigated. Section 6 comments the main results and Section  
7 concludes.   3 
2  Outsourcing and delocalization: TCE and industrial relations 
in local production systems 
 
Although  clearly  related,  outsourcing  and  delocalization  are  far  from  being  coincident 
notions. Broadly defined as the use of goods and services produced externally, outsourcing 
can occur also in the absence of a delocalization, that is of a “a geographical movement or 
transfer of productive activities ...” ( UNIDO, 2003, p.17): such as when it occurs through 
subcontracting. Vice-versa, the decision of delocalizing some production activities out of 
the firm’s local and/or national system does not necessarily entail that their outcome is then 
re-used by the firm itself in loco, that is outsourced. 
Rather then coincident, therefore, the two phenomena can be somehow related. In other 
words, firms can play with the two strategies as either complementary or substitutive, and 
their respective rationale and their relationship can find different specifications depending 
on the theoretical approach and on the relevant context of analysis. 
Following the standard view, as we said, outsourcing should be generally explained in 
the light of TCE. In brief, by simply considering the firm’s attempt of overcoming the risk 
of  post-contractual  opportunism  (“hold-up”)  by  externalizing  non  specific  assets  in  the 
presence of low market uncertainty (Williamson, 1975). In this vein, among the others, the 
intangibility of the firm’s activity, on the one hand, the extent of its product differentiation 
and geographical diversification, on the other hand, can be seen as, respectively, hindering 
and favoring the resort to outsourcing (Gonzalez-Diaz, Arruñada, and Fernandez, 2000).  
This  way  of  looking  at  outsourcing  strictly  relates  to  the  standard  approach  to 
delocalization, based on the idea of “international fragmentation of production” (e.g. Jones 
and  Kierzkowski,  2001).  In  brief,  integrated  production  activities  would  get  segmented 
across international networks providing extra coordination costs (e.g. transportation and 
communication costs) are offset by lower production costs (e.g. less production factors and 
factor price differentials) (Grossman and Helpman, 2005). Also by following this simple 
basic idea, however, the correlation between outsourcing and delocalization can be twofold. 
Indeed, outsourcing and delocalization might be thought to correlate positively, by retaining 
that the search for production cost advantages via delocalization spurs the conversion of 
fixed  costs  into  variable  ones  through  outsourcing.  Conversely,  the  correlation  can  be   4 
thought as negative, if high international co-ordination costs are retained to spur firms not to 
disintegrate in order to avoid further contractual costs. 
Although  a  theoretically  consistent  explanation  of  the  phenomenon,  TCE  arguments 
might however not be the whole story. First of all, a “combined” approach, which integrates 
TCE  with  a  resource-competence-based  view  of  the  firm,  would  suggest  that  for 
outsourcing  to  occur  specialization  advantages  are  required  and  should  outweigh  the 
transaction costs of trading (e.g. Jacobides and Winter, 2005; Nooteboom, 2004). Following 
this  perspective,  the  organizational  placement  of  the  outsourced  activities  in  the  firm, 
typically  in  a  correspondent  division,  should  be  considered  as  a  means  for  codifying 
interfaces-knowledge among the firm’s activities themselves, and thus as an outsourcing 
enabler
1  (Mahnke, 2001). And the same holds true for the hierarchical degree of the firm’s 
organization,  which  thus  contrasts  the  pure  TCE  view  of  it  as  a  spanner  for  multiple 
decision-control mechanisms, which might make outsourcing more conflictive (Mazzanti, 
Montresor, and Pini, 2006a). 
Going beyond standard TCE one should also, and above all, recognize that, in “real 
time”, the outsourcing firm is affected by both the history of its contracts (Argyres and 
Liebeskind, 1999; Langlois, 1992) and by its resources’ complementarities (Mahnke, 2001). 
This argument makes of the firm’s age a crucial variable in accounting for outsourcing. 
What is more, it sets the presence and the role of unions, along with the nature of the firm’s 
industrial relations, at the centre of the stage. Indeed, the direct participation of the workers, 
and  of  their  delegates,  to  the  firm’s  decisions,  augments  the  degree  of  the  firm’s 
“governance  inseparability”  and  might  interact,  if  not  even  contrast,  standard  TCE 
predictions (Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini, 2006a). 
Last, but not least, in dealing with outsourcing one should also try to overcome the 
“atomistic” view of the TCE firm (Montresor, 2004) and retain that the outsourcing firm is 
embedded in specific socio-economic contexts (Granovetter, 1985). This embeddedness is 
particularly relevant with respect to local production systems (LPS) such as, for example, 
industrial districts (e.g. Brusco, 1982; Becattini, 1990). Within this socio-economic context 
outsourcing takes on special features, quite different from large, relatively more isolated   5 
companies. In many Italian industrial districts, for example (e.g. Bramanti, 1992; Goodman, 
Bamford,  and  Saynor,  1989;  Russo,  1986),  outsourcing  has  been  found  to  follow  a 
‘cooperative’, rather than a ‘competitive’ mode, “relying on tacit performance agreements, 
trust, and reciprocal adjustment” (Suarez-Villa, 1998, p.7). And this has been proved to 
prevent the emergence of those disparities among firms - for example, on the access to 
physical and human capital, knowledge and competences - which could make the relative 
transaction  end  up  impoverishing  the  innovative  capabilities  of  the  smaller,  or  weaker 
partner  (e.g.  Suarez-Villa  and  Rama,  1996).  More  in  general,  the  territorial  proximity 
between  purchaser  and  provider  of  the  outsourced  activity  may  potentially  generate  a 
number of “outsourcing economies” (e.g. Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005). 
Going  beyond  TCE,  and  focusing  on  LPS  firms,  also  the  relationship  between 
outsourcing and delocalization finds a more articulated explanation. From this point of view 
outsourcing has been investigated as one of the channels through which local systems are 
becoming sub-systems of broader, global production networks (e.g. Carabelli, Hirsch, and 
Rabellotti, 2007; Camuffo, 2003) with crucial implications for their employment levels, 
labour intensity, skill-upgrading (e.g. Federico, 2005; Murat and Paba, 2005). Once more, 
looking  at  delocalization  as  a  competitive  strategy  for  LPS,  and  adopting  a  more 
comprehensive view of the firm,  the  relationships between the  two phenomena  appears 
twofold. On the one hand, the search for upgrading in high-level global value chains (e.g. 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002) can spur the firm’s reliance on actual external providers, so 
that outsourcing and delocalization would correlate positively. On the other hand, however, 
the entrance in a wider network of external relationships (via delocalisation) might spur the 
firm not to outsource given the pressure of industrial relations for a substitutive choice: 
accordingly, outsourcing and delocalization would correlate negatively.  
In conclusion, the picture one gets by approaching outsourcing and delocalization with 
respect to a LPS environment appears quite complex. A number of potential explanations 
and relationships emerge and find different specifications depending on the relevant context 
of analysis. In order to get a more specific picture, in the following we refer to the LPS of 
Reggio Emilia which, although idiosyncratic in some respects, share some of the features of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1Firms’ activities and capabilities are in fact the easier to separate from each other, for example through 
outsourcing, the more this ‘interface knowledge’ is explicit, that is represented by norms and rules if not even 
by formal organizational relationships.   6 
the typical LPS of Emilia-Romagna, and could thus help us in obtaining results with a 
certain degree of replicability.  
 
3  Outsourcing and delocalization in the local production system 
of Reggio-Emilia 
 
Reggio Emilia (RE, Figure 1) is a province which hosts a particular local production system 
(LPS), characterized by a predominant presence of small and medium enterprises (SME) 
and strongly specialized in chemical, machineries, food, textile, and non metallic minerals 
sectors (Pini, 2004; Seravalli, 2001). The prevalence of SME is partially justified by the 
existence of two districts within the RE industrial system borders: the first, regarding non-
electrical machinery and equipments - machinery for mechanical energy and agriculture in 
particular;  the  second,  concerning  non  metallic  mineral  products  -  ceramic  tales  in 
particular. Given the sectoral distribution of the firms, it can be easily infer that most of 
them operate in a district-like environment (Brusco, Cainelli, Forni, Franchi, Malusardi, and 
Righetti, 1997), usually constituted by networks of SME. 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here  
 
The LPS of RE is also characterized by the presence of public organizations, providing 
funds for services, infrastructures, social security and so on, which contribute to create a 
particularly efficient institutional set-up (Seravalli, 2001). In this context, a fundamental 
role is played by strong, well rooted and proactive unions, which in fact shape the RE 
industrial system.
2  In a strategic framework to which the conflict and the inner adversarial 
nature  of  the  industrial  relations  are  not  unknown,  the  relations  at  firm  level  between 
management  and  union  representatives  are  also  driven  by  participative  and  cooperative 
behaviors in the recognition of mutual aims and gains (Antonioli and Pini, 2004).  
                                                           
2This  is  especially  true  for  the  role  of  CGIL,  the  traditional  confederation  with  socialist  and  communist 
origins. For an overview of the union history and the linkages with political party, see Baglioni (1998).   7 
The overall characteristics of the industrial context outlined above set the RE industrial 
system within what have been called “the local production systems” of the Northern Italy 
(Seravalli, 2001), and make of it a paradigmatic version of the so called “Emilian model” 
(Brusco,  1982;  Brusco  and  Solinas,  1997;  Amin,  1999),  marked  by  the  presence  of  a 
district-like industrial system, a well marked entrepreneurship spirit and an equally strong, 
deep-rooted unionism. On the other hand, however, RE distinguishes for the importance 
hold by the industrial relations system, as well as for that of the innovation activities and of 
their relationship with the former. In particular, the typical “dense” industrial relations of 
the  area  and  the  participation  of  workers’  delegates  to  managerial  decisions  in  work 
organization suggest to carefully consider, along the argument developed in Section 2, the 
potential role of industrial relations themselves and of TCE in accounting for outsourcing 
and delocalization decisions. 
Before moving to this latter point (in Section  
4),  it  is  worthwhile  referring  to  a  recent  survey  on  the  province  of  RE  (Antonioli, 
Delsoldato, Mazzanti, and Pini, 2007) in order to appreciate the actual extent to which 
outsourcing and delocalization are diffused in it, and their particular characteristic features. 
As far as outsourcing is concerned, this survey distinguishes as many as 19 activities, 
which can be grouped into three classes according to a functional criterion: (i) “ancillary 
activities”  (ANC),  so to  say  accessory  to  the production  process  as  such,  meant  as  the 
transformation of production inputs into output (e.g. janitorial services); (ii) “production 
supporting  activities”  (PRODSUP),  not  primarily  productive,  but  contributing  to  the 
production  process  more  directly  than  the  former  (e.g.  engineering);  (iii)  “production 
activities” (PROD) as such. 
 
Insert Table 1 around here  
 
A glance at Table 1 reveals that outsourcing is a quite pervasive phenomenon in the LPS 
of RE, although with important differences in the number and the nature of the activities 
which are externalized. As in other contexts, the outsourcing patterns of the RE firms are 
strategic, as they show a propensity to outsource material, routine-based activities with a   8 
low-value added, and to retain internally intangible activities with a higher value-added. 
What is more, outsourcing appears closely related to the intrinsic characteristics of the same 
LPS. In particular, unions and industrial relations, with a long tradition in the area, have an 
important role in the management’s implementation of outsourcing strategies (Mazzanti, 
Montresor, and Pini, 2006a; Antonioli and Tortia, 2004). 
As far as delocalization is concerned, the same survey allows to distinguish different 
export channels and forms of delocalization of production activities (Table 2). Given the 
large extent of export of RE firms – more than 50% of the whole production is for foreign 
markets, and 70% is the share of firms with export activities
3  – it is quite remarkable that 
only 15% of firms have own establishment for production abroad, while many firms make 
use  of  other  channels  for  export,  such  as  commercial  networks  and  partnership  with 
foreigner  firms.  The  share  of  firms  with  establishment  for  production  abroad  does  not 
change a lot if we consider activities not related to export (17%).
4  
Insert Table 2 around here  
Keeping in mind this recognition of outsourcing and delocalization in RE, let us now 
move to the role that TCE and industrial relations play for them. This is done by applying 
an empirical model to a combined dataset which are both described in the following.  
 
4  The empirical model 
 
The empirical model used in the present paper is an “augmented” form of that we developed 
in a previous work to investigate the general profile of the RE outsourcing firm (Mazzanti, 
Montresor, and Pini, 2006a). The major innovative element with respect to that benchmark 
is the introduction of a temporal lag between outsourcing, on the one hand, and the other 
explicative variables on the other. The reduced form we estimate is then the following:  
 
i   STR DELOC IR TCE OUT  e x  β   x β x  β x β   β   y
i,t- i,t- i,t- i,t- i,t + + + + + =
1 1 1 1 4 3 2 1 0    (1) 
                                                           
3Although this is the case for firms with at least 49 employees, the percentages do not change much if we 
consider also firms with 20-49 employees.   9 
 
In Equation (1) 
i,t OUT y represents the outsourcing ‘output’ of firm i at time t. Rather than 
considering a simple dichotomic variable (of the “yes” or “not” kind), as in the majority of 
the other studies, we here refer to two different variables of outsourcing extent. The first 
one tries to capture the “general outsourcing extent” of firm i (OUT
i) by measuring the 









=   (2) 
where OUT
ij is the extent to which firm i externalises the activity j out of n, with the 
following positions: 0 (no externalized), 1 (partially externalized), 2 (mainly externalized), 
3 (totally externalized). 
The second outsourcing variable instead refers to the “specific outsourcing extent” of 
firm i (OUT
ik) as the average extent to which it externalises the activities of a certain kind k, 
where k = ANC, PRODSUP, PROD.  
As far as the independent variables are concerned, 
1 i,t- TCE x  collects a set of variables 
related  to  TCE  at  time  t-1.  More  precisely,  following  Mazzanti,  Montresor,  and  Pini 
(2006a), and along the arguments of Section 2, we refer to both standard TCE variables and 
to variables which try to augment it by retaining the firm’s organization and its governance 
inseparability (Tab. 3). 
 
Insert Table 3 around here.  
 
As has been discussed in Section 2, TCE arguments are in the present paper considered 
along with outsourcing explanations based on industrial relations, by retaining a number of 
variables, 
1 i,t- IR x , built up by Antonioli, Mazzanti, Pini, and Tortia (2004) and described in 
Table 4. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
4Both the shares increase to almost 20% if we consider only the samples of firms with at least 49 employees.   10
 
Insert Table 4 around here.  
 
Another innovative element of the model with respect to the benchmark is the fact that 
outsourcing is here related to a number of variables,    x
i,t- DELOC 1 , described in Table 5, aimed 
at capturing the extent and the characteristics of the delocalization strategies of the RE 
firms. 
 
Insert Table 5 around here.  
 
Finally,    STRi,t- x
1 refers  to  a  number  of  controls,  among  which,  following  the  results 
obtained in previous studies (Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini, 2006a, 2007), we have also 
retained innovation and flexibility related variables (Tab. 6). 
 
Insert Table 6 around here.  
 
It should be stressed once more that, with respect to the benchmark, the empirical model 
(1) is structured on a hybrid cross section environment, which includes most covariates in 
lagged  terms,  with  an  important  benefit  in  terms  of  reduction  of  potential  endogeneity 
stemming from simultaneity between outsourcing and its potential drivers. Still, we are 
linked  to  a  concept  of  weak  causality  (Michie  and  Sheehan,  2005).  Indeed,  the  causal 
relationship between outsourcing and the independent variables considered – those related 
with innovation in particular – might be bi-directional, so that the regression analysis is 
simply  used  to  detect  significant  correlations.  We  nevertheless  recall  that  even  when 
focusing on “correlations”, rather than causal links – or on “weak causality links”– this 
regression based framework has the major strength that each specific relationship between Y 
(dependent variable) and X
i (independent variables) is controlled for other X
j. This helps to 
mitigate  spurious  correlations  and  to  add  robustness  with  respect  to  simple  bilateral   11
correlations, or other statistical methods that do not control simultaneously for the various 
effects, possibly over emphasizing some relationships.  
5  The dataset 
 
Model [1] is estimated with reference to the manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees 
located in RE, using a new dataset obtained by merging other two ones – Dataset I and 
Dataset 2 – already applied in previous works of ours. 
Dataset I, used for a first set of outsourcing analyses in RE (Mazzanti, Montresor, and 
Pini, 2006a, 2006b, 2007), is based on a direct survey to firm managers carried out in 2002 
for  the period 1998-2001,  and incorporating  balance  sheets data  starting  from 1998  till 
2002. The relative sample refers to 166 firms drawn from a universe of 257 manufacturing 
companies with at least 50 employees, listed in both national (Intermediate Census 1996 of 
the National Institute of Statistics) and local (Camera di Commercio in Reggio Emilia 2001) 
databases.
5    The  sample  covers  64.59%  of  the  entire  population  and  is  overall 
representative.
6  
Dataset  II,  used  for  an  analysis  on  the  relationships  between  innovation,  industrial 
relations and economic performance in RE (Antonioli, Mazzanti, and Pini, 2007b, 2007a), 
is based on a second direct survey to union representatives carried out in 2005 for the period 
2004, and incorporating balance sheets data starting from 1998 till 2002. This sample refers 
to  192  firms  drawn  from  a  universe  of  634  manufacturing  companies  with  at  least  20 
employees, listed - as the previous ones - in both national (Intermediate Census 1996 of the 
National Institute of Statistics) and local (Camera di Commercio in Reggio Emilia 2001) 
databases.
7    The  absolute  number  of  respondents  constitutes  the  51%  of  the  376  firms 
                                                           
5The survey is made up of a questionnaire addressed to the management, through face-to-face interviews, on 
four  main  topics: (a)  firm’s  characteristics  and  employment  structure;  (b)  organizational  innovations  and 
human  resources  management  practices;  (c)  industrial  relations;  (d)  employee  evaluation  and  payment 
systems. 
6The sample firms’ distribution by sector and size is characterized by a limited bias, as the textile sector and 
small-size  firms  (50  to  99  employees)  are  slightly  under-represented.  However,  no  significant  distortion 
emerges  in  all  other  sectors  and  dimensional  employees’  classes,  with  the  number  of  interviewed  firms 
approaching or reaching 100% of the total in many of them. The sample representitiveness is also confirmed 
by the application of a Marbach Test (Cochran, 1977) which yielded tolerable results in a previous application 
(Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini, 2006a). 
7The  survey  is  made  up  of  a  questionnaire  addressed  to  the  union  representatives,  through  face-to-face 
interviews, on five main topics: (a) firm’s structural characteristics; (b) employment structure and labour   12
having union representatives (RSU), out of the 634 of the entire population (30% of the 
entire  population).  Firms  with  at  least  50  employees  represents  the  43%  or  the  entire 
population and the 69% of the surveyed firms, a fact that is mostly due to the lower union 
presence in small firms. A part from this under-representation of small firms, only some 
other minor biases emerge so that the semaple is overall representative.
8   
From the merge of the two previous datasets, a new one is obtained. It refers to 97 
manufacturing firms, with at least 50 employees, with information based on interviews in 
2002 and in 2005, and with balance sheets available from 1998 to 2002. As Table 7 shows, 
the sample reveals a limited bias in the firms’ distribution by sector (textile sector is slightly 
under-represented) and in that by size (relatively small firms - 50-99 employees - are under-
represented given the lower RSU presence affecting the Dataset II). However, applying the 
usual  Marbach  Test  (Cochran,  1977)  we  get  tolerable  results  (Table  8)  so  that  the 
representativeness of the sample is satisfactory. 
 
Insert Tables 7 and 8 around here 
 
Although the merge  generates a limited numbers of observations with respect to the 
original Dataset I, several advantages should be stressed. First of all, we have now a useful 
hybrid  cross  section  framework,  given  the  lag  between  the  main  outsourcing  variables, 
captured for 2004 through the second survey (Dataset II), and the potential explanatory 
variables dated 2001 and 1998-2001, based on the first survey (Dataset I). In this way, 
cross-section endogeneity flaws are mitigated. Secondly, with the merge we can now focus 
on  some  relevant  international  issues:  indeed,  unlike  Dataset  I,  in  Dataset  II  some 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
contracts; (c) innovation policies in technologies, firm organizations, training, adoption of information and 
communication technologies; (d) flexibility in labour utilization; (e) industrial relations. The interviews were 
conducted  on  a  representative  sample  of  250  firms  random  selected  among  the  376  firms  with  union 
representatives, with a very high reply ratio (77%). With respect to Dataset I, this survey goes deeply for 
acquisition of more accurate information on the outsourcing strategies of the firm. In addition, it contains 
information on some international perspective of the firm organizational strategies, such as delocalisation of 
plants and production activities. 
8The machinery sector is the only one to be slightly under-represented, but the Marbach Test (Cochran, 1977) 
still shows results in line with the usually accepted margin of error (Antonioli, Mazzanti, and Pini, 2007b).   13




6  Main results of the empirical application 
 
The empirical application of model [1] to the merged dataset of RE is carried out in two 
different  steps:  we  first  analyze  the  extent  to  which  the  general  outsourcing  index  is 
correlated with the set of regressors, and secondly we focus on the specific sub realms – 
ancillary  activities,  production  activities,  production  supporting  activities  –  in  order  to 
disentangle eventual diverse relationships. 
Before illustrating the two sets of results, the main issues of econometric relevance for 
interpreting them should be addressed first. Endogeneity has already been tackled above, 
and should not represent a major problem, if any, in the analysis. Due to the richness of 
factors, a careful analysis of the correlation matrix has been preliminary attempted, showing 
that high correlations are here not a major flaw (the matrix is available upon request). When 
excessive  correlations  have  been  found,  nevertheless,  variables  have  been  included 
separately in the estimated regressions. This is aimed at reducing collinearity problems, 
selecting  a  limited  set  of  not  highly  correlated  covariates  for  testing  each  specific 
hypothesis. 
Heteroskedasticity,  a  major  flaw  in  cross-sections,  is  here  addressed  by  using  white 
corrected estimators and the potential omission of relevant variables – one of the main 
causes of endogeneity (correlation between explanatory variables and errors) often due to 
data unavailability – is mitigated by the very rich source of explanatory variables we may 
exploit. 
Concerning the regression analysis, a “from general to particular” backward stepwise 
method is here applied, which may result more consistent with this framework since over 
fitting  specifications,  starting  from  a  conceptual  model,  is  less  severe  than  excluding 
relevant factors, and can be resolved by eventually deleting non-significant variables step 
by step. 
                                                           
9To be sure, because of this data availability, unlike in model [1], delocalization variables refer to time t rather 
than to time t-1.   14
Finally,  we  should  stress  that  regressions  are  robust on  many  respects  (Wooldridge, 
2000).  F  tests  denote  good  overall  significance,  mainly  as  expected  for  the  general 
outsourcing index, R
2s are averagely fine
10 , and finally many coefficients linked to relevant 
variables are significant. 
 
6.1  General outsourcing extent 
 
Coming to the main results, the analysis of the general outsourcing extent index, OUT
ij, 
shows a good statistical performance (Table 9), since both F tests and R
2 are (very) high 
(3.08 and 0.22, respectively) if we consider the relatively limited number of units. This 
means that, in addition to, and as a consequence of, sample representativeness, the number 
of observed firms provides a robust basis for sound empirical investigations. 
 
Insert Table 9 around here.  
 
At  the  outset,  such  an  investigation  confirms  our  expectations  about  the  limited 
explicative  role  of  TCE  variables  (Tab.  3)  in  the  LPS  of  RE.  Indeed,  TCE-related 
outsourcing  “predictions”  are  quite  blurred.  While  asset  specificity  (ASPEC)  actually 
discourages outsourcing, unexpectedly for TCE, the same holds true (though much less 
significantly) also for the proxy capturing the administration costs linked to organizational 
complexity (ORGHIER). What is more, uncertainty (MKTUNC) spurs, rather than inhibiting 
as  in  TCE,  outsourcing,  suggesting  that  the  risk  of  facing  problems  of  governance 
inseparability when uncertainty unfolds might matter more than the risk of post-contractual 
opportunism (Mahnke, 2001). 
Our expectations are also confirmed as far as the role of industrial relations and of the 
workers’ involvement in strategic management are concerned (that is for the    IR x  variables 
in Table 4). Both factors actually affect outsourcing decisions significantly, by hampering 
                                                           
10The R
2 is intrinsically lower in cross-sections environments, with “good” values being even at 20% or less   15
it. First of all, when participating to the operational and problem-solving decisions of the 
management (INV-INIT), workers seem able to put their fear of employment losses at work 
by contrasting outsourcing. Second, an alternative specification of the model (not reported 
here for scope constraints
11 ) shows that, when workers’ involvement occurs through the 
unions’ participation to specific outsourcing decisions, it acts in blocking the externalization 
of specific assets (ASPECGOV in Tab. 3)
12 , even when the latter (that is ASPEC) is not 
significantly perceived by the firm as problematic to contract out. 
When moving to delocalization (that is to the x
DELOC
i
 variables of Tab. 5), the results 
suggest that, according to Section 2, delocalizing might actually correlate positively with 
outsourcing,  but  only  at  certain  conditions.  Indeed,  in  general,  benefiting  from  lower 
production costs (DELOC) seem to require the firm turning fixed into variable costs through 
outsourcing. On the contrary, however, establishing foreign production units (FOREPROD) 
and  collaborating  with  foreign  partners  (AGREEM)  to  gain  foreign  market  shares  are 
strategies that firms carry out only “at the price” of lower outsourcing. And this substitutive, 
rather than complementary, relationship is possibly explained by the industrial relations 
arguments we have discussed in the conceptual part (Section 2).
13  In brief, our evidence 
does show that outsourcing and delocalization dynamics are, as expected, quite correlated, 
but that the sign of this relationship is not to be taken for granted, given the high contingent 
nature  of  the  links  and  the  various  theoretical  underpinnings  of  complementary  and 
substitution effects.  
Finally, the “technological profile” of the RE LPS – which is not core in the paper, but 
nevertheless relevant for interpreting the results and easing the control of omitted firm-
specific heterogeneity – seems to matter in accounting for the firms’ outsourcing decisions. 
Indeed, confirming the results we previously obtained in a pure cross-section frame without 
lags (Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini, 2006a, 2006b, 2007), and those of a larger set of 
works,  externalizing  ancillary  activities  to  refocus  on  high  value  added  ones,  or  even 
tapping  into  the  providers’  competences,  correlate  with  the  RE  firms’  product 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(Greene, 2000). 
11All results are nevertheless available upon request, as well as the questionnaire questions. 
12On this point see also Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini (2006a). 
13Let us observe that, once interacted with INVOL3 (i.e. workers’ participation through negotiation), DELOC 
keeps a positive sign, but loses significance. Furthermore, both AGREE and FOREPROD, once interacted with 
INVOLV3, keep a negative sign and increase their significance.   16
innovativeness. What is more, outsourcing seems a necessary organizational innovation to 
supplement technological ones, even in sectors mainly characterized by a Schumpeter Mark 
II technological regime (as shown by the significance of HERFINNO).  
In concluding, let us observe that the structural variables (Tab. 6) provide some further 
elements for better qualifying the results. Quite interestingly, the sectoral dummies seem to 
suggest  that  the  most  industrial-district-like  sectoral  partition  of  the  LPS  outsources 
relatively  less.
14    However,  this  seems  valid  just  for  the  larger  firms,  as  also  the  SIZE 
dummy is significant and negative. All in all, we infer that outsourcing may threaten the 
cohesion of the districts, but only if it concerns their “champions”. 
 
6.2  Specific outsourcing extent 
 
Moving to the analysis of the specific outsourcing extent index, that is OUT
ik, let us observe 
that, in general, the outsourcing of ancillary activities (OUT
ANC) fits the model relatively 
better than general outsourcing, and the reverse holds true for that of supporting-production 
(OUT
PRODSUP) and production activities (OUT
PROD) as such (Tab. 10) 
 
Insert Table 10 around here.  
 
More in detail, as far as TCE predictions are concerned, retaining the different nature of 
the firm’s activities (Tab. 1) helps us in better qualifying the first slot of general results 
obtained in Section  
6.1. First of all, the unions’ role in making the outsourcing of specific assets sensible and 
significant (ASPECGOV in Tab. 3) (even when specific assets alone are not) appears to be 
driven by the risk of post-contractual opportunism with respect to ancillary activities (ANC) 
only.  A  result  that,  although  apparently  a  signal  of  the  weakness  of  the  trade  unions’ 
strategy, concerned with low value added activities, has, as we will see in the following, a   17
certain rationale. As expected, the typical TCE interaction between market uncertainty and 
asset specificity (i.e. MKTASPEC in Tab. 3) becomes significant only for “truly” production 
outsourcing (PROD), while with respect to ancillary ones (ANC) it is idiosyncratic (rather 
than sectoral) firm uncertainty (FIRMUNC in Tab. 3) which calls for vertical integration. 
Reminding that, in general, that is with respect to OUT
ij, uncertainty spurs, rather than 
inhibiting outsourcing, the mixed role that TCE finds in accounting for it in the LPS of RE 
gets confirmed. 
Moving to the role of industrial relations, it is interesting to observe that the presence of 
negotiation actions between unions and management (i.e. INVOLV3 in Table 4) confirms to 
play a braking role only with respect to the outsourcing of ancillary activities (ANC). Once 
interpreted as the attempt of trading outsourcing for other internal kind of changes, this 
result  may  be  perceived  as  a  weakness  of  the  trade  unions’  strategy,  being  ancillary 
activities linked to a lower value in terms of economic relevance, employee skills and other 
factors. One may wonder why unions do not focus their effort on more relevant activities. 
Nevertheless,  it  could  be  that  unions  are  worried  about  the  outsourcing  of  ancillary 
activities since they lead to a substitution of unionized workforce, typically Italian, with non 
unionised  workforce  employed  by  subcontractors  (mainly  migrant  workers  highly 
concentrated in low value added markets). This could lead, in the end, to a net loss for 
unions in terms of unionization of the territory following the outsourcing implementation, 
even if the providers of these externalized, ancillary activities remain local, and not out of 
sight and control.
15  Some weakness may be present in unions bargaining on innovation and 
outsourcing  choices  by  firms,  though  we  claim  that  the  situation  may  more  complex. 
Quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence is needed to interpret the results.  
Quite interestingly, the outsourcing of production activities (PROD) as such “needs” a 
different mechanism to be hampered, as this occurs only when managers and employees 
interact in the relative decision (MAN-EMPL-OUT in Table 4). In other words, with respect 
to higher value added activities, employees function as substitutes for a role potentially 
played by the industrial relation dynamics.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
14The  sectoral dummies  for  machinery  (MACH)  and,  even  more,  ceramic  tiles  (CER) are  significant and 
related to OUT with a negative sign. 
15Recent anedoctical evidence, available from the authors, suggests that this hypothesis may actually be a 
possible explanation of the present result.   18
As far as production supporting activities (PRODSUP) are concerned, investing in high 
performance  work  practices  and  in  workers’  competences  through  their  involvement 
(INVINIT)  seem  to  reduce  the  opportunities  of  outsourcing  strategic  activities  like,  for 
example,  R&D.  As  innovative  opportunity  and  sunk  costs  are  increased  by  these 
investments, it is sensible to think that firms faces endogenously-driven disincentives to 
outsource such a kind of activities.  
All  in  all,  the  analysis  on  specific  activities  tells  a  coherent  story,  mainly  for  the 
influence of employee’s involvement and industrial relations on different aspects of the 
outsourcing decisions.  
Coming to the role of delocalization, let us observe that, unlike in the  general case, 
delocalizing production supporting activities (PRODSUP) through a commercial/business 
unit (COM-UNIT) does not seem to require a ‘compensation’ in terms of less outsourcing. 
Quite  interestingly,  on  production  activities  as  such,  delocalization  strategies  and 
outsourcing seem instead to be run independently. Apart from these results, the level of 
ancillary  activities  basically  confirms  the  positive  and  negative  signs  we  observed  for 
DELOC and the exported oriented strategic decisions for the general outsourcing extent 
indicator (Section  
6.1).  Substitutions  and  complementary  effects  that  were  commented  on  there  thus 
probably derive from the level of ancillary activities which remains, we underline, the most 
widespread in merely quantitative terms.  
Finally, we note that regarding pure controls and innovation variables (Tab. 6), evidence 
is  largely  confirmed  at  all  three  levels.  HERFINNO  shows  a  very  noticeable  good 
significance, as well as INOOTECH and INNOPROD, confirming the positive link between 





                                                           
16Let  us  also  observe  that,  for  OUT
PRODSUP  and  also  for  OUT
PROD,  the  role  of  size  (SIZE)  becomes 
insignificant,  while  for  OUT
PROD  only  time  (i.e  AGE)  increases  outsourcing  experience  rather  than 
governance inseparability.   19
 
7  Conclusions 
 
The paper has presented new conceptual and empirical insights on outsourcing decisions by 
firms embedded in a quite idiosyncratic socio-economic environment. In so doing, it aims at 
integrating TCE theoretical reasoning and arguments on firm outsourcing and delocalization 
strategies with such factors as employees’ involvement and industrial relations. This is, for 
sure, the core point and main added value of the paper. 
Another added value, in our opinion, is the treatment of outsourcing as a strategy that is 
differentiated by the intensity of its adoption and by the kind of activity it refers to. This 
allows a deeper investigation both of the forces moving behind it and of the different links 
occurring at, for example, the level of ancillary or production activities. 
Last, but not least, at empirical level, the richness of explanatory factors and the lag 
structure of the model are a further keystones that add robustness and partially resolve the 
usual flaws encountered in cross section settings.  
Overall, empirical evidence shows that the role of TCE in accounting for outsourcing, at 
least regarding the firms playing in (this) idiosyncratic LPS, is blurred. The TCE binomium 
”asset  specificity-with-uncertainty”  works  only  for  production  activities,  while  the 
significance  of  TCE-related  arguments  decreases,  when  it  is  not  even  contradicted,  by 
considering other kinds of activities. 
The role of industrial relations in accounting for the RE firms’ outsourcing emerges 
instead quite straightforwardly, and with a great incremental value, also claiming for further 
research.  First,  whoever  is  involved  in  the  decisional  process,  workers  and/or  workers 
delegates are able to counteract it, but probably with different objectives and effects. Unions 
seem to play a role in signalling the post-contractual problems of contracting out specific 
assets.  The  way  they  “contrast”  outsourcing  when  negotiation  is  present  is  the  more 
substantial, the more “pervasive”, but the less “strategic” are the outsourced activities. This 
may signals a potential weakness in dealing with outsourcing, or the different roles played 
by  pure  industrial  relations  and  firm  internal  involvement  and  participatory  practices 
witnessing employees and managers to confront on such issues. Some brakes to outsourcing   20
may even derive from managerial decisions, as a consequence of investments in strategic 
assets and innovation. 
We also note that, in general, firms use outsourcing and international delocalization in a 
complementary way. A “disintegrated” organizational structure appears more favourable to 
benefit  from  the  cost  and  competitive  advantages  of  delocalizing.  However,  when 
delocalization  is  used  to  penetrate  foreign  markets,  outsourcing  appears  to  be  used 
substitutively,  since  extra-coordination costs  might  counteract  the  savings in  production 
costs, and unions and worker delegates (consider what commented on above) might want to 
use the two instruments as substitutive bargaining tools. In brief, the correlation between 
outsourcing  and  delocalization  is  “activity-dependent”:  delocalizing  through  a 
commercial/business  unit,  rather  than  a  production  unit  as  such,  might  not  require 
“compensation”  in  terms  of  less  outsourcing;  whereas  delocalization  strategies  and 
outsourcing seem to be run independently if regarding production activities. 
The technological profile of RE firms also matters in accounting for their outsourcing 
decisions,  as  their  technological  innovativeness  (mainly  product  innovations)  correlates 
positively with outsourcing, even at the risk of a certain knowledge leakage. A result which 
confirms previous evidence on both this and other LPSs. Finally, and quite interestingly, the 
most industrial-district-like sectoral partition of the LPS seems to outsource relatively less, 
but with different insights in terms of firm size. Accordingly, outsourcing may be said to 
threaten the cohesion of the RE districts, providing it is made by the district largest firms 
(i.e. their ‘champions’). 
The future research agenda may move along the following directions, in order to provide 
new and more robust outcomes. First, gathering information about the nationality of the 
outsourcer (national vs. international outsourcing)
17  would be essential and really valuable 
with  respect  to  the  literature,  both  to  provide  evidence  on  strategic  choices  of 
internationalization  and  to  analyze  more  in  depth  the  extent  to  which  the 
regional/national/international  content of outsourcing  matters for  industrial  relations  and 
bargaining outcomes between the parties. An hypothesis to test is related to the fact that 
unions and employees are more willing to bargain on outsourcing if this remains within the 
                                                           
17Although the reference dataset contains some rough data on this point, the relevant analysis has been omitted 
from the paper and postpone in order to collect and elaborate more accurate information.   21
LPS, thus more easily monitored in its dynamics. In addition, it would be helpful also to 
refine the analysis of delocalization strategies by retaining the organizational structure of 
the  firms  (national  vs.  multinational  corporations).  Finally,  extending  the  analysis  to  a 
broader sample of firms, possibly at regional level if not national, is certainly a way to 
provide  more  general  results  and  limit  the  role  played  by  idiosyncratic  factors  which, 
nevertheless, are interesting since they show the extent to which theoretical approaches and 
associated hypotheses must be adapted and interplayed when facing complex LPS.   22
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Figure 1: The province of Reggio-Emilia   28
 
Outsourced activities 
Full sample 2004:  
192 firms with more than 
19 employess 
Reduced 2004 sample:  
134 firms with more than 
49 employees 
Restricted 2004 sample:                 
97 firms with more than 49 
employess (used in the analysis) 












Ancillary activities  54.76  1.185  56.18  1.183  53.00  1.119 
1.   Inventories management  17.19  0.240  20.15  0.284  19.00  0.260 
2.   Distribution, logistics and transports  58.85  1.167  60.45  1.172  54.00  1.040 
3.   Machinery maintenance  55.73  0.958  58.21  0.993  57.00  0.950 
4.   Plants maintenance  70.31  1.745  72.39  1.791  72.00  1.810 
5.   Cleaning services  76.56  1.922  82.09  2.060  79.00  2.010 
6.   Payroll management   68.23  1.641  64.93  1.470  57.00  1.300 
7.   Electronic data processing (e.g. accounting, data, EDP)  36.46  0.625  35.07  0.515  33.00  0.460 
Production supporting activities  20.77  0.320  20.71  0.313  18.57  0.277 
8.   Engineering  28.13  0.422  24.63  0.373  21.00  0.330 
9.   Research  22.92  0.349  22.39  0.328  18.00  0.250 
10. Development and testing procedures  23.44  0.318  23.88  0.313  20.00  0.260 
11. Human Resource Management (HRM)  9.90  0.135  10.45  0.134  10.00  0.120 
12. Quality control  13.54  0.188  11.94  0.149  12.00  0.140 
13. Sales  19.79  0.281  20.90  0.313  16.00  0.240 
14. Marketing  31.77  0.578  34.33  0.634  33.00  0.600 
15. Integrated information systems (ERP, SCM, CRM, …)  16.67  0.292  17.16  0.261  17.00  0.220 
Production activities  36.98  0.538  39.74  0.582  39.75  0.573 
16. Supply of intermediate products  63.02  0.979  66.42  1.000  65.00  0.910 
17. Specific production stages (e.g. assemblying, packaging, …)  37.50  0.458  37.31  0.455  37.00  0.440 
18. Specific products to be sold  30.73  0.464  35.07  0.552  36.00  0.610 
19. Specific trademarks  16.67  0.250  20.15  0.321  21.00  0.330 
Average on all activities  36.71  0.685  37.78  0.690  35.63  0.646 
 
Table 1: Outsourced activities in RE (2004): (1) percentage of firms with outsourced activities on the total; (2) outsourcing average 
extent (0 = activity not outsourced; 1 = partially outsourced; 2 = mostly outsourced; 3 = totally outsourced)   29 
 
Full sample 2004:  
192 firms with more 
than 19 employess 
Reduced 2004 
sample:  
134 firms with 
more than 49 
employees 
Restricted  2004 
sample: 97 firms with 
more than 49 
employess (used in 
the analysis) 
  N.  %  N.  %  N.  % 
Delocalization: 
Establishments for production abroad, 
not related to export activities 
33  17.19  27  20.15  19  19.59 
Export channels             
Establishments for production abroad   29  15.10  26  19.40  19  19.59 
Commercial headquarters abroad  48  25.00  44  32.84  35  36.08 
Partnerships in local foreign firms  26  13.54  24  17.91  18  18.56 
Agreements with local commercial 
networks   109  56.77  82  61.19  61  62.89 
Others (trade fair, etc.)  46  23.96  34  25.37  26  26.80 
 
 
Table 2: Delocalization and export channels of production activities  







Table 3: TCE related variables   31
  
 











i  INVOLV  Degree of involvement between managers 
and unions (workers delegates) on 
techno-organisational changes 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing the 
intensity of involvement, from absence, to low 
involvement (information only), to medium 
involvement (consultation), to high (negotiation) 
ii  INVOLV1  Involvement through information  Dummy variable capturing the presence of 
information actions related to adoption of 
innovations 
iii  INVOLV2  Involvement through consultation  Dummy variable capturing the presence of 
consultation actions related to adoption of 
innovations 
iv  INVOLV3  Involvement through negotiation  Dummy variable capturing the presence of 
negotiation actions related to adoption of 
innovations 
v  INDREL  Degree of involvement between managers 
and unions (workers delegates) on 22 
defined issues (employment, production, 
innovation, training, health, wages, etc..) 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing the 
increasing intensity of involvement: from 
absence, consultation, to negotiation 
vi  MAN-EMPL  Degree of involvement between managers 
and employees (workers delegates) on 22 
defined issues (employment, production, 
innovation, training, health, wages, etc..) 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing the 
increasing intensity of involvement: from 
absence, consultation, to negotiation 
vii  MAN-EMPL-OUT  Degree of involvement between managers 
and employees  on the outsourcing  issue 
Variable taking value 0,1,2 according to no 
involvement, consultation, negotiation 
viii  INV-INIT  Manager initiatives to involve employees 
in production activities and/or problem 
solutions; 
Workers’ participation to production 
decisions 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing the 
increasing intensity of participatory initiatives: 
from absence, to hierarchical ones, to 
teamworking, to joint committees, to more 
participatory pronounced actions 
ix  BTC  Bilateral manager-workers technical 
committees 
Dummy variable for the presence in the firm of 
bilateral technical committees for consultation and 
negotiation on selected issues 
x  INNO-PART  Consultation and delegation activities  in 
work organization 
Additive index built by synthesizing the intensity 
of introduction and presence of participation 
practices in work organization (see table 12, 
Antonioli et al., 2004) 
xi  INNO-ACTION  Tecno-organisational and work changes 
introduced through the action of unions, 
joint committees or workers involvement 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing 13 
work and innovation changes introduced through 
the involvement of unions, joint committees or 
workers in 1998-2001 
xii  INNO-ACTION1  Tecno-organisational and work changes 
introduced through the action of unions 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing 13 
work and innovation changes introduced through 
the involvement of unions in 1998-2001 
xiii  INNO-ACTION2  Tecno-organisational and work changes 
introduced through the action of joint 
committees 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing 13 
work and innovation changes introduced through 
the involvement of joint committees in 1998-2001 
xiv  INNO-ACTION3  Tecno-organisational and work changes 
introduced through the action of workers 
involvement 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing 13 
work and innovation changes introduced through 
the involvement of workers in 1998-2001   32
i  DELOC  International delocalization  Foreign direct investments in 
production activities (d) 
ii  FOREPROD  Production delocalization 
for exports 
Foreign production units for 
supporting exports (d) 
iii  COM-UNIT  Commercial delocalization 
for exports 
Foreign commercial/business unit for 
supporting exports (d) 
iv  FOR-PART  Foreign participation for 
exports 
Ownership participation to a foreign 
firm for supporting exports (d) 
v  AGREEM  Foreign agreements for 
exports 
Agreement with a foreign 
commercial/business network for 





Table 5: Delocalization variables 
    33
 
 
Table 6: Structural control variables 
 
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
i  SIZE  Size of the firm  Number of employees (2004) 
ii  MACH  Machinery 
sector 
Firm belonging to machinery sector (d) 
iii  CER  Ceramic sector 
(non metal 
minerals) 
Firm belonging to ceramic sector (d) 
iv  INTREV  International 
market revenue 
(openness) 
Share of revenue in international markets 
v  PRIV  Private firm  Private ownership (d), vs cooperative ownership, group 
membership 
vi  TRAIN  Training   Training Coverage 
vii  SKILL  Skill workforce 
content 
Ratio of skilled on unskilled workers 
INNOVATION VARIABLES 
viii  INNOTECH  Technological 
innovativeness 
Index of technological innovation averaging process, product 
and quality product innovations (1998-2001) 
ix  INNOPROD  Product 
innovation 
Product innovations (1998-2001) 
x  INNOPROD  Process 
innovation 
Process innovations (1998-2001) 
xi  HERFREV  Market 
concentration 
Herfindhal index of the sector’s revenues 
xii  HERFINNO  Innovation 
concentration 
Herfindhal of innovations 
xiii  SPEARINNO  Sectoral 
turbulence in 
innovation 
activities   
Spearman correlation in innovation rankings 
xiv  INNOORG  Organisational 
innovations 
Index averaging the adoption of five organizational practices 
( TQM, QC, JIT, TW, TR) 
FLEXIBILITY VARIABLES 
xv  FLEXREL  Flexibility in 
work 
organizations 
labor service flexibility in work organizations 
xvi  FLEXINNO  Firm flexibility  synthetic index of flexibility indicators   34
 
 




Sectors  Margin of error q q q q  Size (employees)  Margin of error q q q q 
Food  0,277  50-99  0,148 
Other Industries  n.a.  100-249  0,132 
Chemical  0,391  250-499  0,171 
Wood and Paper  0,661  500-999  0,200 
Machineries  0,101  > 999  0,443 
Non-metallic mineral  0,168       
Textile  0,537       
Total  0,080  Total  0,080 
 
Table 8: Marbach test 
  Size (employees)  Total 
Sectors  50-99  100-249  250-499  500-999  >999  %  Abs. 
values 
Food  0.00  3.09  2.06  2.06  0.00  7.22  7 
Other Industries  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0 
Chemical  2.06  2.06  1.03  0.00  0.00  5.15  5 
Wood and Paper  0.00  0.00  2.06  0.00  0.00  2.06  2 
Machineries  23.71  19.59  9.28  4.12  3.09  59.79  58 
Non-metallic mineral  6.19  8.25  3.09  4.12  1.03  22.68  22 
Textile  2.06  1.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.09  3 
Total (%)  34.02  34.02  17.53  10.31  4.12  100.00   
Total (absolute values)  33  33  17  10  4    97 
  Size (employees)  Total 
Sectors  50-99  100-249  250-499  500-999  >999  %  Abs. 
values 
Food  0.78  1.95  1.17  0.78  0.78  5.45  14 
Other Industries  0.78  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.78  2 
Chemical  3.11  2.72  0.78  0.00  0.39  7.00  18 
Wood and Paper  1.56  0.78  1.17  0.00  0.00  3.50  9 
Machineries  28.02  15.95  5.06  2.72  3.50  55.25  142 
Non-metallic mineral  9.73  6.61  1.95  2.72  0.78  21.79  56 
Textile  1.56  1.56  2.72  0.00  0.39  6.23  16 
Total (%)  45.53  29.57  12.84  6.23  5.84  100.00   
Total (absolute values)  117  76  33  16  15    257   35
Dependent variable: OUT 
Covariates 
Constant     1.940    
ASPEC       -2.208 ** 
ORGHIER     -1.449   
MKTUNC       2.659 *** 
INV-INIT    -2.055 **   
DELOC        2.810 *** 
AGREEM      -1.871 * 
FOREPROD    -3.293 *** 
INNOPROD     3.097 *** 
HERFINNO     3.212 *** 
FLEXREL      1.885 * 
SIZE        -2.129 ** 
MACH        -1.753 * 
CER         -2.731 *** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2194750      
F-test (prob)   3.08 (.0009) 
 









Table 10: Specific outsourcing extent 
Dependent variable: OUTANC  Dependent variable: OUTPRODSUP  Dependent variable: OUTPROD 
Covariates  Covariates  Covariates 
Constant    2.630  Constant      -1.394  Constant        2.128    
ASPEGOV    -5.091 ***  ORGHIER       -3.008 ***  MKTASPE       - 2.575 ** 
MKTUNC      3.948 ***  MKTUNC         2.920  ORGHIER        -2.536 ** 
FIRMUNC    -2.510 **  FIRMUNC       -1.747 *  AGE             1.282   
INVOLV3     -3.310 ***  INVINIT       -2.600 ***  MAN-EMPL-OUT   -2.018 **   
DELOC       2.134 **  BTC           -1.657  INNOPROD        2.763 *** 
AGREEM     -2.416 **  COM-UNIT       1.948 *  HERFINNO        2.426 ** 
FOREPROD   -2.506 **  INNOTECH       1.904 *  STRUCTORG       2.366 ** 
HERFINNO3   0.235 ***  HERFINNO       2.452 **  SIZE           -0.775    
SKILL       1.572  FLEXREL        2.397 **  MACH            0.126    
SIZE       -1.027  SUBFOR         1.435  CER            -0.991    
MACH       -1.777 *  SIZE          -1.569   
CER        -3.901 ***  MACH          -2.147 **   
  CER           -1.543   
Adj. R
2   0.3038220 
F-test prob) 4.49 (.0000)  
Adj. R
2      0.1633140 
F-test(prob)  2.44 (.0075) 
Adj. R
2       0.1253886 
F-test(prob)  2.38 (.0155) 